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SUBJECT: OLYMPIC SECURITY COORDINATOR - PRE-GAME
SITUATIONAL REPORT.

1. This pre-game situational report provides information pertaining to continued efforts by RSO Rome Nancy Rolph-O'Donnell, OSC Daniel Weber, and FBI OC Ray Mey, in the USG's planning and preparations in support of the 2006 Winter Olympic Games in Turin.

2. Commencing on January 4, 2006, USG Olympic security operations were initiated in Turin with the arrival of 19 DSS agents, 10 FBI agents, 2 DOD JOC/TIC representatives, 4 NGA representatives, 2 NCTC representatives as well as continued IMO support from American Embassy Rome, American Consulate Milan and RIMC Frankfurt. OSC Weber and FBI OC Mey provided the newly arrived USG TDYERS with the following briefing and training activities:

January 10	Overall security Olympic, Joint Operations Center and Threat Integration Center briefing and the USG Olympic operational planning briefing.
January 11	Comprehensive venue tour of all significant Olympic sites and villages.
January 12	Briefing by TOROC security management and Introduction to respective security venue commanders, key security contacts.
January 12	SOCOM Briefing on tactical survey information for all Olympic venues and villages.
January 13	DSS and FBI field liaison elements begin site surveys and protective intelligence liaison activities.

3. At this time, the USG Coordination Office in Turin is not in possession of a detailed and comprehensive operations plan from the GOI for it's Olympic security concerns. Based on a number of GOI official responses to the USG over the past seven months, it appears to the RSO, OSC and FBI OC that Italian operational plans remain in a developmental process both in Rome and in Turin as the games approach. Predicated upon previous briefings on Italian security efforts for special events it appears to the RSO, OSC and FBI OC that this process is a standard procedure for the host government efforts to address and complete final operational planning for special events such as the Olympic Games. As we are all aware, The GOI has on a number of occasions utilized this particular security process to address previous high level major events security requirements throughout Italy. Because of previous GOI successes such as hosting the G-8 summit, large soccer matches and the recent funeral of the Pope in Rome, the GOI has chosen to adopt this same process for Olympic game security planning.

4. RSO Rome Rolph-O'Donnell, OSC Weber and FBI OC Mey note that while we have made and are enjoying some advancements in our relationships with our senior Italian law enforcement counterparts, we continue to look for and explore ways in which to further address outstanding emergency contingency planning questions such as TOROC and GOI venue evacuation procedures, identification of law enforcement venue commanders, as well as specific procedures pertaining to Italian law enforcement response, i.e. hostage situations, WMD matters and command and control. RSO, OSC and FBI OC note that we have thoroughly reviewed the GOI, MOI's responses to what has commonly become known as the " five questions", specifically five questions posed via American Embassy Rome for RSO, Weber and Mey to the MOI in our attempt to better understand the GOI's Olympic contingency planning. These questions were provided to the MOI via a Diplomatic Note from the American Embassy, Rome in mid October 2005.

5. The MOI's response has not included the same level of specificity as those of a USG effort for special event responsibilities. Clearly the GOI security efforts are not

synonymous with USG domestic special events planning and preparations. Conversely, it is also apparent to the RSO, OSC and FBI OC that Italian planning and capabilities far exceed those capabilities and planning put forward in Athens by the GOG in their attempt to host a summer Olympics.

16. Over the next 20 days, as we approach the opening ceremonies in Turin, RSO, OSC and OC FBI will continue to work closely with our Italian hosts to ensure all USG, USA Sponsor and Corporate America, USOC security concerns are properly noted and addressed. Further more, USG field liaison components will continue to develop close working relationships with TOROC and GOI law enforcement representatives in furtherance of our commitment to a safe and secure winter games. RSO, OSC, FBI OC will update accordingly.
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